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The rule of the present case, in securing the application of
laches on both sides of federal court to claims based on unsea-
worthiness, tends to promote the uniformity of maritime sub-
stantive law, and so fulfills the policy behind the Supreme Court
cases which developed the theory of maritime law supremacy.
27
Complete uniformity in this regard, however, would not exist
unless state courts entertaining claims for personal injury caused
by. unseaworthiness were also bound to apply the doctrine of
laches. There are apparently no cases holding state courts so
bound.2 8 However, the Supreme Court has required state courts
to apply substantive maritime law instead of state law in deter-
mining the burden of proof of the validity of a seaman's re-
lease,29 and the proper limitation applicable to a claim based
on unseaworthiness when joined with a claim under the Jones
Act.80 It is conceivable, therefore, that in the future a state court
may be compelled to apply the admiralty doctrine of laches to a
claim for personal injury caused by unseaworthiness.
C. Jerre Lloyd
ALIMONY - EFFECT OF FAULT UNDER R.S. 9:301
The wife separated from her husband, who was frequently
visiting the home of an unmarried woman, and she brought suit
for divorce on the grounds of adultery. Because she failed to
prove the alleged adultery, the divorce was not decreed, but she
had used in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). See note 19 supra,
for a brief exposition of that case.
27. The notion that maritime law should be uniform throughout the country
was announced by the Supreme Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205 (1917). The doctrine of the supremacy of maritime law outside the admiralty
courts can be traced to this case. See GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 374 (1957).
However, state law has been allowed to supplement maritime law in the areas of
liens, wrongful death statutes, partition and sale of vessels, arbitration, and insur-
ance. See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 79 S.Ct. 468, 480
(U.S. 1959).
28. The United States Supreme Court declined to decide the question in both
Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926) (state may not apply its limitation period
to the Jones Act, which contains a three-year limitation period of its own), and
McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958) (when claim based
on unseaworthiness is joined with count for negligence under the Jones Act, state
may not apply a limitation of less than three years to either count).
29. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1952) (suit in state court
for negligence under the Jones Act and maintenance and cure).
30. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958). The Jones
Act provides that: "Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of
his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with
the right of trial by jury." 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
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continued to live separate and apart from her husband. The hus-
band subsequently obtained a divorce on the grounds of a two-
year separation in fact,1 and the wife was awarded alimony.2
The husband appealed from this award, claiming the wife was
not free from fault, as required by the Code. The Supreme Court
held affirmed. The wife will be denied alimony only when her
misconduct is an "independent contributory or proximate cause
of the separation." Chief Justice Fournet dissented on the
ground that the burden of proof is on the wife to show that she
is free from fault in causing the marital discord that culminated
in the separation and in this case the evidence falls far short of
such proof. Kendrick v. Kendrick, 106 So.2d 707 (La. 1958).
Originally, Article 160 of the Civil Code allowed the wife ali-
mony only if she had obtained the divorce or a separation before-
hand. This meant that the husband had to be "at fault" within
the contemplation of Article 138 of the Code.3 The allowance of
1. LA. R.S. 9:301 (1950) : "When married persons have been living separate
and apart for a period of two years or more, either party to the marriage contract
may sue . . . for an absolute divorce, which shall be granted on proof of con-
tinuous living separate and apart of the spouses, during the period of two years
or more."
2. LA. CIVIM CODE art. 160 (1870) : "If the wife who has obtained the divorce
has not sufficient means for her maintenance, the Court may allow her in its
discretion, out of the property and earnings of her husband, alimony which shall
not exceed one-third of his income; provided, however, that in cases where, under
the laws of this State a divorce is granted solely on the grounds that the married
persons have been living separate and apart for a certain specified period of time,
and the husband has obtained a divorce upon the grounds of such living separate
and apart, and the wife has not been at fault, then the Court may allow the wife,
in its discretion, out of the property and earnings of her husband, alimony which
shall not exceed one-third of his income
"This alimony shall be revocable in case it should become unnecessary, and in
case the wife should contract a second marriage."
3. Id. art. 138: "Separation from bed and board may be claimed reciprocally
for the following causes:
"1. In case of adultery on the part of the other spouse;
"2. When the other spouse has been convicted of a felony and sentenced to
death or to imprisonment at hard labor in the state or federal penitentiary;
"3. On account of habitual intemperance of one of the married persons, or
excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages of one of them toward the other, if such
habitual intemperance, or such ill-treatment is of such a nature as to render
their living together insupportable;
"4. Of a public defamation on the part of one of the married persons to-
wards the other;
"5. Of the abandonment of the husband by his wife or the wife by her
husband;
"6. Of an attempt of one of the married persons against the life of the
other;
"7. When the husband or wife has been charged with a felony, and shall
actually have fled from justice, the wife or husband of fugitive may claim a
separation from bed and board, on producing proofs to the judge before whom
the action for separation is brought, that such husband or wife has actually
been guilty of such felony, and has fled from justice;
"8. On account of the intentional non-support by the husband of his wife,
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a divorce merely for living separate and apart for a required
number of years first appeared in our law in 1916. From 1916
to 1928 it was possible for the husband to obtain a divorce on
these grounds; and even though the wife may have been blame-
less, she would be denied alimony only because she was not the
one who obtained the divorce. 4 To remedy this situation, Article
160 was amended in 1928 to allow alimony to the wife against
whom a judgment of divorce was rendered, if the grounds were
solely for living separate and apart and the wife was not "at
fault." With this there arose the new problem, unsettled even
today, of determining when the wife is not "at fault" within the
contemplation of Article 160 as amended.5 The court, in deciding
the fault issue, usually rests its decisions on the finding as to
which party was predominately at fault, apparently balancing
the merits of the positions involved, but without establishing a
definite criterion to use in close cases.6 In the recent case of
Oliver v. Abunza,7 the court used this approach in determining
that the wife was not at fault. In a concurring opinion Justice
McCaleb indicated that the wife should have been adjudged not
at fault because she had obtained a judgment of separation on
the grounds of abandonment after her husband had left her; thus
there was judicial recognition that she was not the cause of the
separation. In Moser v. Moser,8 it was the husband's contention
that when his wife was denied a judicial separation after she had
separated from him, this should be res judicata of the fault issue
in his subsequent suit for divorce. The court rejected this idea,
however, saying that because the husband was found not to be at
fault does not necessarily mean that the wife was.
The approach of Justice McCaleb in the Oliver case and the
husband in the Moser case suggests a logical interpretation of
Article 160 as amended. From 1916 to 1928, the husband who
who is in destitute or necessitous circumstances, or by the wife of her husband
who is in destitute or necessitous circumstances;
"9. When the husband and wife have voluntarily lived separate and apart
for one year, and no reconciliation has taken place during that time."
Note: The ninth clause is not applicable to our discussion because it does not
list a cause which allows one spouse to separate from the other.
4. North v. North, 164 La. 293, 113 So. 852 (1927).
5. For a discussion of the disadvantages of determining the alimony award by
the fault issue, see The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1941-1942
Term - Civil Code and Related Subjects, 5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 193, 196
(1943).
6. See, e.g., Hornsby v. Hornsby, 208 La. 316, 23 So.2d 105 (1945) ; White v.
Broussard, 206 La. 25, 18 So.2d 641 (1944) ; Jones v. Jones, 200 La. 911, 9 So.2d
227 (1942) ; Scott v. Scott, 197 La. 726, 2 So.2d 193 (1941).
7. 226 La. 456, 76 So.2d 528 (1954).
8. 220 La. 295, 56 So.2d 553 (1951).
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was clearly at fault within the meaning of Article 138 could ob-
tain a divorce on the grounds of a separation in fact, and the
innocent wife could not receive alimony.9 This was the evil that
the 1928 amendment was designed to correct. Thus, the legisla-
ture must have intended that the wife whose husband had ob-
tained a divorce on the grounds of a separation in fact should be
allowed alimony where the husband was at fault under Article
138. This would mean that the wife should be found not at fault
if she would have been entitled to a judicial separation when the
separation in fact took place. 10 The court could determine this
if one of the parties actually sued for a separation prior to the
husband's divorce suit, or if neither party sued for a separation,
the court could determine from the facts, in the divorce suit,
whether the separating spouse had a legal cause to leave under
Article 138. If not, that spouse should be adjudged at fault for
abandonment. By use of this approach, the court would have a
definite legislative criterion on which to determine the fault
issue.
There are indications in the prior jurisprudence as pointed
out by Chief Justice Fournet's dissenting opinion in the instant
case, that the burden of proof is on the wife to show that she is
not at fault in her claim for alimony." However, in the above
approach, it is submitted that the burden should always be on the
separating spouse to show a legal cause in leaving, because a
separation without legal cause is the equivalent of abandonment
within Article 138. This would be true whether the separating
spouse be the husband or the wife. Thus, the wife would be con-
sidered free from fault (1) as a result of such a finding in a
separation suit which may have been brought after the separa-
tion in fact took place or, assuming neither party sued for sep-
aration, (2) if, having separated from her husband, the wife
proved in the divorce suit that she had grounds for separation
under Civil Code Article 138, or (3) if the husband, having sep-
9. North v. North, 164 La. 293, 113 So. 852 (1927).
10. In the cases where the court finds that the parties separated by mutual
consent, with neither having a legal cause under Article 138, then fault would
exist as to neither, and it would appear that the wife would not be "at fault"
and should receive alimony. See Bienvenue v. Bienvenue, 192 La. 395, 188 So. 41
(1939). If the court finds that both parties had a legal cause for separation under
Article 138, then both parties would be at fault, and it would appear that alimony
should not be allowed.
11. The court has handled this problem many times without going into the
burden of proof. The cases found which did go into this issue, however, have held
that the burden is on the wife. See Creel v. Creel, 218 La. 382, 49 So.2d 617
(1950) ; Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 214 La. 905, 39 So.2d 338 (1949).
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arated from his wife, failed to prove in the divorce suit that he
had grounds for separation under Article 138. Of course, if the
parties separated by mutual consent, neither having grounds for
separation under Article 138, then it would appear that fault
would exist as to neither, and alimony should be awarded.
The majority in the instant case found the wife not to be at
fault, but it did not reveal the method used in determining this.
Applying the facts in this case to the suggested approach would
put the wife in the position of proving that when she left her
husband she had legal cause to do so, if she were to receive ali-
mony. Whether or not she would have received the award is
questionable because the court may or may not have considered
the actions of the husband to have been cruelty within the con-
templation of Article 138 (3) ,12 thus giving her a legal cause to
leave. But in any event, by use of this approach there would be
less danger to the stability of marriage which could result from
awarding alimony to an abandoning wife whose husband did not
give her legal cause for divorce or separation. 18
Peyton Moore
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -PREEMPTION OF STATE SUBVERSIVE
ACTIVITIES LAW BY FEDERAL LAW
Defendant was charged with a violation of the Louisiana
Subversive Activities Law' in that she was a member of the
Communist Party, which she knew to be a subversive organiza-
tion. Her motion to quash the bill of information was based, in
part, on the contention that the subject matter of subversive
activities had been preempted by federal legislation. The trial
court sustained the motion. On appeal to the Louisiana Supreme
Court, the state argued that only sedition against the United
States had been preempted and that states could prosecute for
seditious activities against local or state governments. Held,
12. In Adams v. Adams, 196 La. 464, 199 So. 392 (1940), the court did not
decide whether the very acts complained of here would have allowed a separation
on the grounds of cruelty because they were not proved.
13. This does not, however, preclude the danger which could arise from indis-
criminately awarding alimony to the wife who obtains a divorce after a two-year
separation in fact, whether or not she was at fault. But where this situation pre-
sented itself in McKnight v. Irwin, 228 La. 1088, 85 So.2d 1 (1956), the court
inferred that if the wife had claimed alimony, the fault issue would have been
raised, and the award made only if she was not at fault.
1. La. Acts 1954, No. 603, now LA. R.S. 14:366-380 (Supp. 1958).
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